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OPINION OF THE COURT  
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McKEE, Chief Judge. 
 This case arises from a vigorous dispute between the 
Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge 1 as well as certain police 
officers (“Plaintiffs”) on one side, and the City of Camden, 
New Jersey and certain supervisory police personnel 
(“Defendants”) on the other.  Plaintiffs claim that the City’s 
“directed patrols” policy constitutes an illegal quota system.  
Specifically, they allege that the policy violates New Jersey’s 
anti-quota law.  They also accuse Defendants of illegal 
retaliation in violation of New Jersey’s Conscientious 
Employee Protection Act (“CEPA”), the First Amendment, 
and the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”).   
 
 The district court granted summary judgment to 
Defendants on all of Plaintiffs’ claims.  For the reasons set 
forth below, we will reverse in part, affirm in part, and 
remand for further proceedings.  
 
  I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
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In 2008, Camden implemented a policy known as “directed 
patrols” requiring police officers to engage with city residents 
even though the residents are not suspected of any 
wrongdoing.  The announced purpose of the program was to 
obtain information about the community while making the 
police presence more visible.  The City claims that the 
purpose was also “to ensure that the maximum amount of 
resources was allocated to a proactive crime prevention 
strategy and better balance [the Police Department] response 
to community-generated calls.”1  The directed patrols 
program consisted of “a structured 15-20 minute deployment 
into a targeted area to accomplish a specific patrol or crime 
reduction function.”2  According to the City, the deployment 
was to last no more than 15 to 20 minutes absent extenuating 
circumstances.  The policy also instructed officers to obtain 
personal information, such as the name and address of the 
individuals the officers interacted with, if the individuals 
agreed to provide it.  During any encounter with residents, 
officers were also expected to “approach community 
members present and inquire about criminal activity or 
quality of life issues.”3 
  
 According to the City, directed patrols in Camden 
were not new.  “[T]he difference in the new system was that 
directed patrols would be tracked and recorded.  Under the 
new violence reduction initiative, directed [p]atrols were to be 
logged by the [City’s] Computer Aided Dispatch System.”4  
  
 In April 2009, Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge 1 filed 
a complaint against the City of Camden Police Department 
and the Attorney General of the State of New Jersey claiming 
Camden had imposed an unlawful quota policy.  Officers on 
supplemental patrol were expected to conduct a minimum of 
twenty-seven directed patrols per shift and officers on regular 
patrol were expected to perform a minimum of eighteen.  
According to Plaintiffs, failure to comply with these 
                                              
1 Defendants’ Br. at 1. 
2 Id. 
3 Id. at 2. 
4 Id. at 1. 
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numerical requirements is cause for disciplinary action.  
Plaintiffs claim that this results in a quota system of policing 
in violation of N.J.S.A. 40A:14-181.2.  
  
 The individual plaintiffs Officers Galiazzi, Holland, 
and Williamson further allege that Defendants violated CEPA 
by retaliating against them because they expressed their 
disagreement with the policy.  Officers Galiazzi and Holland 
claim they were placed on a low-performer list for failure to 
comply with the policy.  They also contend the retaliation 
included transfer from the elite unit, where they had been 
assigned, to regular patrol duty with a concomitant pay 
decrease.  To support this assertion, they point out that 
another officer on the low performer list who did not object to 
the policy was not transferred.  
 
Officer Williamson, the President of Fraternal Order of 
Police, Lodge 1, claims Camden retaliated against him for 
leading a protest march to City Hall.  Specifically, he asserts 
that the City retaliated by bringing disciplinary charges 
against him for purportedly accosting a nurse at a hospital and 
for failing to report that someone had a thumb drive with 
Camden Police Department information.     
 
 Plaintiffs also allege other forms of retaliation that 
included revocation of vacation time, disciplinary limits on 
sick leave, and surveillance by Camden’s Internal Affairs 
unit.  Officer Holland claims that the restrictions on his sick 
leave also violated his rights under the FMLA.  Finally, 
Plaintiffs assert that Camden’s retaliatory conduct also ran 
afoul of the First Amendment because the plaintiff-officers’ 
objections to the policy constitute protected speech. 
 
 New Jersey’s anti-quota law only prohibits numerical 
requirements for arrests or citations.5  Thus, Camden’s 
primary defense is that the patrols policy at issue here is not 
an illegal quota because it does not require a certain number 
of arrests or citations, only police-civilian interactions.  In any 
event, Defendants argue that there was no causal connection 
between the plaintiff-officers’ objections and any adverse 
                                              
5 N.J. Stat. Ann. § 40A:14-181.2 (West).  
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actions, and this precludes any violation of CEPA or 
Plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights.   
 As we noted at the outset, the district court granted 
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment in its entirety and 
entered judgment against all plaintiffs on all of their claims.  
The court concluded that New Jersey’s anti-quota statute is 
inapplicable to the patrols policy and thus cannot support 
Plaintiffs’ allegations of a quota.6  It dismissed Plaintiffs’ 
CEPA7 and First Amendment8 claims because it found that, 
even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 
Plaintiffs, they did not establish a causal link between their 
whistleblowing activities and the alleged adverse actions.  
Finally, the court found Officer Holland failed to establish a 
prima facie FMLA violation because he did not show that he 
was precluded from using sick leave or that he was otherwise 
prejudiced by Camden’s actions.9  This appeal followed. 
 
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
The district court had jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ 
federal claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  It had 
supplemental jurisdiction to hear their state law claims 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.  The grant of summary 
judgment constitutes a final order.  Thus, we have appellate 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 
We review grants of summary judgment de novo, 
applying the same standard as the district court.10  
Accordingly, we view the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party.  In doing so, we refrain 
from weighing the evidence and draw all reasonable 
inferences in the nonmovant’s favor.11  We will affirm the 
                                              
6 Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge 1 v. City of Camden, No. 
CIV. 10-1502 NLH AMD, 2015 WL 1471800, at *4 (D.N.J. 
Mar. 31, 2015). 
7 Id. at *7. 
8 Id. at *8. 
9 Id. at *9. 
10 See Montone v. City of Jersey City, 709 F.3d 181, 189 (3d 
Cir. 2013). 
11 See Marino v. Indus. Crating Co., 358 F.3d 241, 247 (3d 
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district court’s grant of summary judgment only if we 
conclude that there is no genuine dispute as to any material 
fact when the evidence is so viewed.12  
III. DISCUSSION 
 
As summarized at the outset, Plaintiffs claim that the 
district court erred in dismissing their claims under (1) New 
Jersey’s anti-quota law; (2) CEPA; (3) the First Amendment; 
and (4) the FMLA.  In addition, they argue that the district 
court erred when it ignored hearsay evidence and concluded 
that Defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  
We discuss each claim of error in turn.  
 
A. Hearsay 
 
 The district court was troubled that some of the 
evidence Plaintiffs planned to produce at trial was hearsay.  
That evidence consisted of statements by the individual 
plaintiffs about statements other officers purportedly made 
concerning the alleged retaliation and the nature of the 
patrols.  This evidence is hearsay.  However, the court erred 
in refusing to consider it at the summary judgment stage.  Its 
explanation for concluding that it could not consider hearsay 
in ruling on a motion for summary judgment is limited to the 
following footnote:  
 
Galiazzi and Holland state in their 
depositions that they were told by other 
officers that they were transferred and 
investigated because of what they wrote 
on their counseling forms with regard to 
the quota system. The Court cannot 
consider this inadmissible hearsay, and 
no affidavits or testimony from these 
officers is provided as part of the 
record.13 
 
                                                                                                     
Cir. 2004). 
12 FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). 
13 Fraternal Order of Police, 2015 WL 1471800, at *5 n.9.  
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 We disagree.  “[T]he rule in this circuit is that hearsay 
statements can be considered on a motion for summary 
judgment if they are capable of being admissible at trial.”14  
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court need 
only determine if the nonmoving party can produce 
admissible evidence regarding a disputed issue of material 
fact at trial.15  The proponent need only “explain the 
admissible form that is anticipated.”16  Thus, in ruling on 
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, the district court 
should have limited its inquiry to determining if the out-of-
court statements Plaintiffs were relying on were admissible at 
trial, and they clearly were.  Plaintiffs identified the out-of-
court declarants—Sergeants Frett, Moffa, and Whitesell, and 
Lieutenants Cook and Strang—and noted their availability to 
testify.   
 
 In arguing to the contrary, Defendants rely in part on 
Philbin v. Trans Union Corporation.17  In Philbin we 
explained that “Philbin is unable to identify the person who 
relayed this information to him . . . . Thus the hearsay 
statement by this unknown individual is not ‘capable of being 
admissible at trial,’ . . . and could not be considered on a 
motion for summary judgment.”18  Here, Plaintiffs identified 
the third-party declarants, and nothing suggests that those 
declarants would be unavailable to testify at trial.  That is all 
                                              
14 Stelwagon Mfg. Co. v. Tarmac Roofing Sys., 63 F.3d 1267, 
1275 n.17 (3d Cir. 1995) (emphasis added); see also Celotex 
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986) (“We do not mean 
that the nonmoving party must produce evidence in a form 
that would be admissible at trial in order to avoid summary 
judgment.”); Shelton v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J., 223 
F.3d 220, 223 n.2 (3d Cir. 2000) (“In this circuit, hearsay 
statements can be considered on a motion for summary 
judgment if they are capable of admission at trial.”). 
15 FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(2). 
16 FED. R. CIV. P. 56 advisory committee’s note to 2010 
amendment. 
17 101 F.3d 957 (3d Cir. 1996).  
18 Id. at 961 n.1. 
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that was required to survive that aspect of Defendants’ motion 
for summary judgment.19 
 We do not, of course, intend this ruling to control 
whether these out-of-court statements will actually be 
admitted at trial.  That question need not be answered now.  
Accordingly, we will reverse the district court’s exclusion of 
hearsay in determining if the record allowed Plaintiffs to 
survive a motion for summary judgment. 
 
B. New Jersey Anti-Quota Law 
 
 Plaintiffs assert that Camden’s patrols policy violates 
New Jersey’s anti-quota statute.  That statute, entitled 
“Quotas for arrests or citations prohibited; use of numbers in 
law enforcement officer evaluations,” provides in relevant 
part: 
a. A State, county or municipal 
police department or force . . . 
shall not establish any quota for 
arrests or citations. The 
department or force may, 
however, collect, analyze and 
apply information concerning the 
number of arrests and citations in 
order to ensure that a particular 
officer or group of officers does 
not violate any applicable legal 
obligation.  
 
b. The department or force shall 
not use the number of arrests or 
                                              
19 See Blackburn v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 179 F.3d 81, 
102 (3d Cir. 1999) (“We will assume that Blackburn’s 
testimony regarding what Zileski told him was effectively a 
proffer of the testimony that Zileski himself would give at 
trial, and we therefore treat this as evidence capable of being 
admitted at trial.”); J.F. Feeser, Inc. v. Serv-A-Portion, Inc., 
909 F.2d 1524, 1542 (3d Cir. 1990) (“[T]here is no indication 
that Spagnola’s salesforce would be unavailable to testify at 
trial. [Thus t]he averments of Spagnola’s affidavit are capable 
of proof through admissible evidence.”). 
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citations issued by a law 
enforcement officer as the sole 
criterion for promotion, demotion, 
dismissal, or the earning of any 
benefit provided by the 
department or force. Any such 
arrests or citations, and their 
ultimate dispositions, may be 
considered in evaluating the 
overall performance of a law 
enforcement officer.20 
 
 Plaintiffs claim that this statute applies to the directed 
patrols policy even though the statute’s text only addresses 
arrests and citations.  Although the challenged patrols policy 
only requires civilian encounters, Plaintiffs claim that it is 
applied in a manner that also mandates citations.  In arguing 
to the contrary, Camden claims that since the New Jersey law 
only applies to arrests and citations and the patrols policy has 
no such requirements, the policy is consistent with the New 
Jersey statute. 
 
 In granting summary judgment on this claim in favor 
of Camden, the district court correctly relied on the limited 
scope of the text of the statute—which does apply only to 
arrests and citations, and not to the civilian “encounters” that 
are at the center of this dispute.  Accordingly, we will affirm 
the court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Camden 
on Plaintiffs’ claims under the anti-quota law. 
 
C. Conscientious Employee Protection Act  
 
 CEPA protects employees against retaliation by 
employers for whistleblowing activities.  It provides in 
relevant part: 
An employer shall not take any 
retaliatory action against an 
employee because the employee 
does any of the following: . . . 
Objects to, or refuses to 
                                              
20 N.J. Stat. Ann. § 40A:14-181.2 (West) (emphases added). 
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participate in any activity, policy 
or practice which the employee 
reasonably believes: (1) is in 
violation of a law, or a rule or 
regulation.21 
 
CEPA is remedial legislation and must therefore be construed 
liberally in employees’ favor.22   
 
New Jersey courts have created a four-pronged test for 
adjudicating CEPA claims that largely replicates the three-
part burden-shifting test that is used to decide federal 
retaliation claims.23  To establish a CEPA violation, a plaintiff 
must prove that:  (1) she reasonably believed her employer 
was violating a law or rule; (2) she performed a protected 
whistleblowing activity; (3) an adverse employment action 
was taken against her; and (4) there is a causal connection 
between the whistleblowing activity and the adverse action.24  
The district court found Plaintiffs’ CEPA claim failed 
because it was “deficient on at least two of the required 
elements,” namely, the first and last prongs.25  We disagree.  
 
Plaintiffs correctly argue that the first prong only 
requires that they had a reasonable belief the policy was 
illegal.26  They need not prove an actual illegality.  The court 
found the plaintiff-officers faltered here because, although 
they may have subjectively believed the policy was illegal, 
“that belie[f] was not objectively reasonable.”27  The court 
specified that “[a]ny officer who reads the clear and plain 
                                              
21 N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:19-3 (West). 
22 See Blackburn v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 179 F.3d 81, 91 
(3d Cir. 1999) (“The New Jersey courts have repeatedly held 
that CEPA was enacted ‘to protect employees from retaliatory 
actions by employers.’”) (internal citation omitted). 
23 See Caver v. City of Trenton, 420 F.3d 243, 254 (3d Cir. 
2005). 
24 Id. 
25 Fraternal Order of Police, 2015 WL 1471800, at *4. 
26 See Blackburn, 179 F.3d at 94 n.4; Dzwonar v. McDevitt, 
828 A.2d 893, 901 (N.J. 2003).  
27 Fraternal Order of Police, 2015 WL 1471800, at *4. 
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language of the statute would immediately understand that it 
only applies to ‘arrests’ and ‘citations,’ . . . the directed patrol 
policy does not encompass arrests or citations.”28  
  
 However, CEPA is not intended “to make lawyers out 
of conscientious employees but rather to prevent retaliation 
against those employees who object to employer conduct that 
they reasonably believe to be unlawful.”29  Requiring a 
showing that the anti-quota law actually applies to the written 
policy imposes an obstacle that is as unfair as it is 
unreasonable.  These plaintiffs should not have to satisfy a 
standard that is more appropriate for someone with a law 
degree.  Moreover, under CEPA “a plaintiff [need not even] 
allege facts that, if true, actually would violate that statute, 
rule, or public policy.”30  Thus, Plaintiffs clearly satisfied the 
first prong of their prima facie case for a CEPA violation.  
Summary judgment on the CEPA claim was therefore not 
appropriate. 
  
 Camden attempts to reduce Plaintiffs’ proof on the 
second prong of CEPA to frivolity by arguing that the 
plaintiff-officers’ protests amount to nothing more than the 
whining of a “squeaky wheel” and by suggesting that CEPA 
is “a ‘Whistleblower Act,’ not a ‘Chronic Complainer 
Act.’”31  This is offensive.  Irrespective of the underlying 
validity of the plaintiff-officers’ claims, they certainly 
concern non-trivial matters.  They allege workplace 
retaliation, as well as a law enforcement policy with possible 
constitutional implications for matters of increasingly urgent 
public interest.32  We did not need the most recent 
                                              
28 Id. 
29 See Blackburn, 179 F.3d at 94 n.4 (internal citation 
omitted). 
30 Dzwonar, 828 A.2d at 901.  
31 Blackburn v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 3 F. Supp. 2d 504, 
517 (D.N.J. 1998) aff’d, 179 F.3d 81 (3d Cir. 1999).  
32 In fact, Camden’s own case law citations highlight the 
seriousness of the plaintiff-officers’ allegations.  For instance, 
Camden cites a case that explains that an employee could not 
reasonably believe extended lunch breaks or personal phone 
calls would fall under CEPA, and complaints about such 
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controversies arising from attacks on police or police 
shootings of unarmed civilians to appreciate that the 
relationship between police officers and residents in the high 
crime areas that they patrol is of the utmost importance.33  It 
is indeed unfortunate that the City chooses to view police 
officers with these kinds of concerns as “chronic 
complainers” and “squeaky wheels.” 
Plaintiffs also satisfied their burden under the third 
prong.  CEPA defines retaliation as including “discharge, 
suspension or demotion of an employee, or other adverse 
employment action taken against an employee in the terms 
and conditions of employment.”34  The record suggests that 
the plaintiff-officers’ transfers from the elite unit to regular 
patrol came with a change in duties and a decrease in pay and 
status.  Accordingly, at this stage, these transfers are 
“demotions.”  At the very least, they affect “the terms and 
conditions of employment” as required under CEPA.  Thus, 
they qualify as adverse employment actions under CEPA’s 
third prong.   
 
We do, however, conclude that not all of the disputed 
actions would constitute retaliation under CEPA.  The district 
court was correct in finding that placement on an “abuse of 
sick time” list, the cancellation of a vacation, and a visit by an 
Internal Affairs officer do not rise to the level of adverse 
employment actions absent more than is alleged here.35  
                                                                                                     
matters are not a protected whistleblowing activity.  Estate of 
Roach v. TRW, Inc., 754 A.2d 544, 552 (2000).  The 
allegations here are far weightier, and thus fall more squarely 
within CEPA’s purview. 
33 See Julie Turkewitz, Baton Rouge Grapples with Anxiety 
and Grief Amid Vigils for Officers, N.Y. TIMES (July 19, 
2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/20/us/baton-rouge-
louisiana-shooting.html; Kimberly Kindy et al., A Year of 
Reckoning: Police Fatally Shoot Nearly 1,000, WASH. POST 
(Dec. 26, 2015), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/investigative/wp/2015/12/
26/2015/12/26/a-year-of-reckoning-police-fatally-shoot-
nearly-1000/. 
34 N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:19-2(e) (West). 
35 Fraternal Order of Police, 2015 WL 1471800, at *6. 
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CEPA does encompass a range of retaliatory actions.  
However, in order for actions to qualify under CEPA, they 
must have “impacted on the employee’s ‘compensation or 
rank’ or be ‘virtually equivalent to discharge.’”36  These 
additional actions fall short of that threshold.  
 
Likewise, Officer Williamson’s allegations do not 
qualify as adverse action under CEPA.  He contends that 
Camden retaliated against him in four ways:  (1) 
reprimanding him for an incident in which he allegedly 
accosted a nurse; (2) charging him with a disciplinary action 
for not reporting that an attorney had a thumb drive with 
information about the Camden Police Department; (3) 
investigating him as a result of an argument during a union 
meeting; and (4) investigating him for “procedural 
violations.”  As the district court rightly noted, these actions 
did not affect Officer Williamson’s compensation or rank nor 
were they equivalent to discharge.37  Thus, only the plaintiff-
officers’ claim of retaliatory transfers satisfies the third prong 
of CEPA. 
 
 Finally, CEPA’s fourth prong requires proof of a 
causal connection between the whistleblowing activity and 
the adverse employment action.  The district court found that 
“[t]he missing fundamental element of plaintiffs’ NJ CEPA 
claims is the causal connection between their ‘whistle-
blowing’ and their adverse employment actions.”38  We 
disagree with several aspects of the district court’s analysis of 
this issue.  
 
 First, the district court concluded that the real reason 
for the adverse actions was deficient performance, not the 
plaintiff-officers’ objections.39  We fail to see how that factual 
conclusion negates the existence of a genuine issue of 
material fact.  Rather, whether the adverse actions resulted 
from deficient performance or objections to the disputed 
                                              
36 Caver v. City of Trenton, 420 F.3d 243, 255 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(internal citation omitted). 
37 Fraternal Order of Police, 2015 WL 1471800, at *7. 
38 Id. at *4. 
39 Id. at *5-6. 
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policy is precisely the type of factual dispute that is 
inappropriate for summary judgment. 
 
 Second, the district court afforded insufficient weight 
to the temporal proximity of the plaintiff-officers’ objections 
and the alleged retaliatory actions.  Though we generally hold 
that closeness in time alone cannot establish causation,40 we 
have found that close temporal proximity41 or an added factor 
making the closeness unusually suggestive can suffice.42  
Here, Plaintiffs submitted evidence that the court should have 
viewed in the light most favorable to them.43  That evidence 
disclosed that some of their objections were followed by 
adverse consequences within a matter of days.  For instance, 
they asserted that “[d]espite Holland’s improved statistics, he 
was placed on the low performer list . . . and transferred to 
regular patrol . . . . only days after he opposed his written 
counseling.”  Retaliatory motive is often revealed by such 
evidence.44  At the very least, it certainly raises a question of 
fact for a jury. 
                                              
40 See Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271, 280 
(3d Cir. 2000) (“[T]emporal proximity alone will be 
insufficient to establish the necessary causal connection when 
the temporal relationship is not ‘unusually suggestive.’”). 
41 See Jalil v. Avdel Corp., 873 F.2d 701, 708 (3d Cir. 1989) 
(“He demonstrated the causal link between the two by the 
circumstance that the discharge followed rapidly, only two 
days later, upon Avdel’s receipt of notice of Jalil’s EEOC 
claim.”). 
42 See Krouse v. Am. Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494, 503 (3d 
Cir. 1997) (“Even if timing alone could ever be sufficient to 
establish a causal link, we believe that the timing of the 
alleged retaliatory action must be ‘unusually suggestive’ of 
retaliatory motive before a causal link will be inferred.”). 
43 See Marino v. Indus. Crating Co., 358 F.3d 241, 247 (3d 
Cir. 2004). 
44 See Kachmar v. SunGard Data Sys., Inc., 109 F.3d 173, 
177 (3d Cir. 1997) (“Cases in which the required causal link 
has been at issue have often focused on the temporal 
proximity between the employee’s protected activity and the 
adverse employment action, because this is an obvious 
method by which a plaintiff can proffer circumstantial 
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 The district court expressly refused to consider the 
testimonial evidence the plaintiff-officers submitted tending 
to show a link between their objections and the alleged 
retaliation.  The court believed that evidence could not be 
considered because it was hearsay.45  We have already 
explained why that was error.  For these reasons, we will 
reverse the district court’s dismissal of the plaintiff-officers’ 
retaliatory transfer claims under CEPA.   
 
D. First Amendment 
  
 The plaintiff-officers claim that Defendants violated 
their First Amendment rights by retaliating against them for 
objecting to the patrols policy.  A public employee’s 
statement is protected by the First Amendment when “(1) in 
making it, the employee spoke as a citizen, (2) the statement 
involved a matter of public concern, and (3) the government 
employer did not have ‘an adequate justification for treating 
the employee differently from any other member of the 
general public’ as a result of the statement he made.”46  
  
 The plaintiff-officers provide compelling arguments to 
support their claim that their speech involved a matter of 
public concern.  They objected to the policy on police 
department counseling forms, writing, among other things, 
“QUOTA[]S ARE ILLEGAL!.”47  These writings were 
internal and arguably of a private nature, but that does not 
mean they do not pertain to a matter of public concern.  
Matters of public concern may overlap with personal 
                                                                                                     
evidence ‘sufficient to raise the inference that her protected 
activity was the likely reason for the adverse action.’”) 
(internal citation omitted). 
45 Fraternal Order of Police, 2015 WL 1471800, at *5 n.9.  
46 Gorum v. Sessoms, 561 F.3d 179, 185 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(quoting Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 241 (3d 
Cir. 2006)). 
47 App. 519a.  See Feldman v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 43 F.3d 
823, 829 (3d Cir. 1994) (“Disclosing corruption, fraud, and 
illegality in a government agency is a matter of significant 
public concern.”). 
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grievances.48  Indeed, many employees may not be motivated 
to speak out on matters of public concern until they feel 
personally aggrieved by their employer.49  When all else at 
work is going well, it is the rarest of employees who is so 
altruistic that she will risk her livelihood to object to a matter 
of public concern.  The law does not, and should not, ignore 
legitimate claims of retaliation merely because the employee 
is less than pleased in the workplace.50   
 In addition, as the Supreme Court stressed in 
Pickering, “free and open debate is vital” to matters of 
legitimate public concern.51  The disputed policy here directly 
affects how police officers interact with the public, especially 
with residents of crime infested communities.  That is not 
only a matter of public interest, it has become a matter of the 
utmost importance.  Therefore, restriction of the plaintiff-
officers’ right to voice their opinions cannot be taken 
lightly—“freedom of speech is not traded for an officer’s 
badge.”52 
  
 The district court reasoned that, “even accepting that 
plaintiffs’ opposition to the directed patrol policy was a 
                                              
48 See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 387 n.11 (1987) 
(“The private nature of the statement does not . . . vitiate the 
status of the statement as addressing a matter of public 
concern.”); Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 420 (2006) 
(“That Ceballos expressed his views inside his office, rather 
than publicly, is not dispositive. Employees in some cases 
may receive First Amendment protection for expressions 
made at work.”). 
49 See Brennan v. Norton, 350 F.3d 399, 413 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(“Common sense suggests that public employees, no less than 
other employees, will be more likely to speak out when they 
are disgruntled or personally dissatisfied with some aspect of 
their employment or employer.”). 
50 See id. at 412 (“This does not, however, suggest that speech 
which is motivated by private concern can never qualify as 
protected speech. It clearly can if it addresses a matter that 
concerns the public as well as the speaker.”). 
51 Pickering v. Bd. of Ed. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, Will 
Cty., Ill., 391 U.S. 563, 571-72 (1968).  
52 Biggs v. Vill. of Dupo, 892 F.2d 1298, 1303 (7th Cir. 1990).  
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matter of public concern, plaintiffs cannot meet the other two 
elements of their First Amendment violation claims.”53  The 
court concluded that their First Amendment claims failed for 
lack of causation for the same reasons as their CEPA 
claims.54  We have already explained why the court erred in 
dismissing the CEPA claims.  Nevertheless, we agree with the 
district court that the plaintiff-officers’ First Amendment 
claims cannot proceed. 
  
 The Supreme Court has explained that “when public 
employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, 
the employees are not speaking as citizens for First 
Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate 
their communications from employer discipline.”55  Here, the 
plaintiff-officers were not speaking as citizens when they 
wrote on the counseling forms.  Citizens do not complete 
internal police counseling forms.  Rather, completing 
counseling forms as part of the police disciplinary process 
falls under officers’ official duties.  Therefore, the plaintiff-
officers’ speech here “owe[d] its existence to [their] public 
employee[] professional responsibilities.”56   
  
 Because the plaintiff-officers were not speaking as 
citizens, if their supervisors thought the writings were 
“inflammatory or misguided, they had the authority to take 
proper corrective action.”57  Though the First Amendment 
provides robust protection to statements pertaining to matters 
                                              
53 Fraternal Order of Police, 2015 WL 1471800, at *8. 
54 Id. (“For the same reasons explained above with regard to 
their NJ CEPA claims, plaintiffs have not provided sufficient 
evidence to go to a jury that their speech was a substantial or 
motivating factor in the alleged retaliatory actions, or that the 
Camden Police Department would not have taken the same 
action even if the speech had not occurred. Consequently, 
defendants are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs’ 
First Amendment violation claims.”). 
55 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006) (emphasis 
added). 
56 Gorum v. Sessoms, 561 F.3d 179, 185 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(citation omitted). 
57 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 423. 
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of public concern, it does not empower public employees to 
“constitutionalize the employee grievance”58 when they are 
acting in their official capacities.  Accordingly, we will affirm 
the court’s dismissal of the plaintiff-officers’ First 
Amendment claims.59   
 
E. Family and Medical Leave Act 
 
The FMLA affords eligible employees “a total of 12 
workweeks of leave during any 12-month period”60 in order 
to tend to “a serious health condition that makes the employee 
unable to perform the functions of the position.”61  In 
addition, employees are entitled to FMLA leave to care for a 
family member with a serious health condition.62  It is 
“unlawful for any employer to interfere with, restrain, or deny 
the exercise of or the attempt to exercise, any right provided” 
in the FMLA.63  A claim that these rights have been breached 
is referred to as “interference.”64 
 
Officer Holland alleges that he was approved for 
FMLA leave to care for his seriously ill mother in May 2009.  
                                              
58 Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 154 (1983). 
59 We will also affirm the district court’s dismissal of the 
plaintiff-officers’ New Jersey Constitution First Amendment 
claim, which the court premised on identical grounds.  
Fraternal Order of Police, 2015 WL 1471800, at *8 n.12.  
Because the district court also based its dismissal of the 
plaintiff-officers’ § 1983 claim on its rejection of their First 
Amendment claim, we will affirm the district court’s § 1983 
holding as well.  Id. at *8 n.13 (“Because plaintiffs cannot 
sustain their First Amendment claims, their claims against the 
City of Camden also fail.”). 
60 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1). 
61 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D). 
62 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C). 
63 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1). 
64 Two types of claims can arise under the FMLA, retaliation 
(29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2)) and interference (29 U.S.C. § 
2615(a)(1)).  See Lichtenstein v. Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. 
Ctr., 691 F.3d 294, 301 (3d Cir. 2012).  Officer Holland’s 
claim sounds in interference. 
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However, on May 27 he was orally warned that he was using 
too much leave.  Then, on June 17 he received a letter from a 
Lieutenant stating he was being placed in the “Chronic Sick 
Category.”  When he informed the Lieutenant of his approved 
FMLA leave, the Lieutenant said the Inspector did not care if 
it was approved and Officer Holland would continue to be 
placed in the category and would eventually be disciplined.  
Officer Holland also asserts that Camden staff visited him at 
home while he was on leave.    
 
Officer Holland claims these actions interfere with 
protected FMLA leave.65  He argues that a DOL regulation 
provides an expanded definition of FMLA interference as 
including not only denying leave, but also deterring an 
employee from using it.  This regulation provides that 
“[i]nterfering with the exercise of an employee’s rights would 
include, for example, not only refusing to authorize FMLA 
leave, but discouraging an employee from using such 
leave.”66  Camden granted Officer Holland’s request for 
FMLA leave to care for his mother.  However, Officer 
Holland claims that, pursuant to this regulation, a reasonable 
trier of fact could find that Camden’s placing him on a 
chronic sick list and threatening to discipline him chilled the 
assertion of his FMLA rights. 
Camden contends that this “interference” was in part 
an internal miscommunication.  According to Camden, 
Officer Holland was questioned about his use of leave 
because one branch of the department was unaware this leave 
had been approved under the FMLA.  Camden further asserts 
that none of its actions were “sufficient to deter a person of 
ordinary firmness from exercising [their] right[s].” 
 
Camden officials only visited Officer Holland once 
while he was on leave, and we agree that this was minimally 
intrusive.  Without more, we agree that Camden’s conduct is 
                                              
65 Officer Holland also advances an FMLA claim pursuant to 
New Jersey’s FMLA, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:11B-9 (West).  
Analysis of Officer Holland’s claim is the same under the 
federal and state FMLAs.  Accordingly, our assessment under 
the federal FMLA covers both claims. 
66 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(b) (emphasis added). 
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not actionable under the FMLA.  Although we are 
sympathetic to Officer Holland’s family situation, “there is no 
right in the FMLA to be ‘left alone.’”67  Camden’s actions 
may have been insensitive, but they were not beyond the 
limitations the FMLA places on employers attempting to 
manage their workplaces.68 
 
Officer Holland’s claim is also doomed by an 
insufficient showing of injury.  The FMLA “provides no 
relief unless the employee has been prejudiced by the 
violation.”69  The only case Officer Holland cites to the 
contrary is Shtab v. Greate Bay Hotel.70  There, the district 
court found a jury could conclude that denial of immediate 
FMLA leave for an employee who had just returned to work 
constituted interference.71  Shtab does not support Officer 
Holland’s claim that reprimands such as those he alleges can, 
on their own, support relief under the FMLA.  Rather, they 
must occur in tandem with actual harm.72  Officer Holland 
does not allege he was actually denied FMLA leave.  In fact, 
he concedes that he was able to take time off to care for his 
mother.  Accordingly, the court was correct in granting 
summary judgment against Officer Holland. 
 
F. Qualified Immunity 
 
                                              
67 Callison v. City of Phila., 430 F.3d 117, 121 
(3d Cir. 2005). 
68 Id. at 120. 
69 Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 535 U.S. 81, 89 
(2002). 
70 173 F. Supp. 2d 255 (D.N.J. 2001).  
71 Id. at 258-59, 267-68. 
72 See Conoshenti v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 364 F.3d 
135, 143 (3d Cir. 2004) (finding that an employee would only 
be able to prove FMLA interference if he established that the 
employer’s actions rendered “him unable to exercise that 
right in a meaningful way, thereby causing injury”) (emphasis 
added). 
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 In addition to suing the City of Camden, Plaintiffs also 
sued several officers in their individual capacities.73  Those 
officers objected to the suits on the ground that they are 
protected by qualified immunity.  The doctrine of qualified 
immunity “shields government officials from civil damages 
liability unless the official violated a statutory or 
constitutional right that was clearly established at the time of 
the challenged conduct.”74  In assessing qualified immunity 
claims, we conduct a two-part inquiry.  We must first 
determine whether the facts demonstrate the violation of a 
right.  If they do, we must then decide if the right at issue was 
clearly established at the time of the alleged misconduct.75  
According to Defendants, Plaintiffs’ claim fails the first part 
of the test because, as the rest of the case makes clear, no 
rights were violated.  
 
 The district court agreed that the doctrine of qualified 
immunity shields these individual officers from suit.  It 
explained:  “Because the Court finds that plaintiffs cannot 
support their claims that defendants violated their 
constitutional rights, the qualified immunity analysis ends 
there.”76   
 
 We agree with the district court’s conclusion that 
qualified immunity depends, in part, on whether a legal 
violation occurred.  Since Plaintiffs have not shown a 
violation of federal law, we need not reach the issue of 
qualified immunity.   
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the district 
court’s order granting summary judgment to Defendants on 
Plaintiffs’ CEPA claims.  We will remand for proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.  We will affirm the district 
                                              
73 Police Chief Scott Thomson, Inspector Orlando Cuevas, 
and Lieutenant Joseph Wysocki. 
74 Reichle v. Howards, 132 S. Ct. 2088, 2093 (2012). 
75 See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009). 
76 Fraternal Order of Police, 2015 WL 1471800, at *7 n.11.  
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court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ New Jersey anti-quota law, 
First Amendment claims, and Officer Holland’s FMLA claim. 
